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The subject of this research is the practice of tolerance, or gedogen by ad-
ministrative agencies: a practice whereby administrative agencies do not 
comply with the rules by exercising adequate supervision and by impos-
ing and enforcing corrective sanctions. Particular focus is on the extent to 
which tolerance can be practised under administrative law and the conse-
quences of such practice under administrative, criminal and civil law for the 
agencies practicing tolerance (or the legal person, established by virtue of 
public law of which the administrative agency is part), the offender who is 
the object of the tolerance, third parties and the criminal law authorities. 
The research revolved around three central questions. These central ques-
tions are addressed by answering nine sub questions. 
Central question I:
‘With what national and European legal standards (the law of the European 
Union and the ECHR) should the practice of tolerance comply?’ 
Sub questions:
1. What should we understand by tolerance as practiced by administrative 
agencies? (chapter 2)
2. What material standards under administrative law apply to administra-
tive tolerance? (chapter 3)




4. What standards under administrative law apply to tolerance for canna-
bis coffee shops? (chapter 5)




6. What legal safeguards exist under administrative law in respect of the 
diverse decisions relating to tolerance? (chapter 6)
Central question II: 
‘What are the judicial consequences of tolerance for the authority practicing 
tolerance, the tolerated party, third parties and the criminal authorities?’
Sub questions:
7. What judicial consequences does the withdrawal of tolerance have for 
the tolerated offender? (chapter 7)
8.  To what extent does the practice of tolerance affect criminal proceed-
ings? (chapter 8)
9. What judicial consequences does the practice of tolerance have for a 
third party? (chapter 9)
Central question III:
‘Should the practice of tolerance be legislated and more specifically should 
legislation be introduced to regulate the practice of tolerance by adminis-
trative agencies?’ 
In chapter 10 (Legislated tolerance?) central question III is addressed on the 
basis of material gleaned from previous chapters. 
The	first	question	is	what	we	should	understand	by	tolerance	as	practiced	by	
administrative agencies (chapter 2). At a more contemplative level it is con-
cluded that the practice of tolerance has its legal base in the policy granting 
administrative	agencies	the	freedom	to	enforce	and	its	material	justification	
in the ‘dilemma of the constitutional state’. On the one hand the principals 
of the constitutional state require the administrative agencies to supervise 
compliance with the laws and in the absence thereof to take suitable and 
effective enforcement measures and to implement these as needed. On the 
other hand the principals of the constitutional state imply that no enforce-
ment	measures	need	be	taken	in	specific	cases.	In	addition,	considerations	of	
effectivity can, in some circumstances, represent a valid reason to practice 
a policy of tolerance. Tolerance enables the authority to regulate the spe-
cific	situation.	Administrative	agencies	are	regularly	caught	off-guard	by	a	
citizen	who,	under	the	motto	‘He	who	builds	wins’,	has	prematurely	begun	
on a building project without a permit. The citizen in question then claims 
his action should be tolerated because the illegal situation can be legalised 
by still granting a permit. A citizen who acts rashly without due considera-
tion of the lawful interests of others, ‘the rash citizen’ does not deserve to 
be treated generously by the administration and courts. On the other hand 
citizens may be expected to show some understanding with regard to the 
genuine special circumstances of a fellow citizen, which could give rise to 




tions of the concept. In view of the fact that for the application of adminis-
trative law the relevance of tolerance is largely derived from the extent to 
which it is expressed in a decision as provided for in art. 1:3 of the Nether-
lands	General	Administrative	Act	(Awb),	the	official	description	is	formed	
on	the	basis	of	the	decision.	The	official	description	of	tolerance	reads:	1)	
the competent administrative agency’s decision to 2) refrain from impos-
ing sanctions or to refrain from enforcing sanctions 3) with regard to an 
observed (or anticipated) violation, 4) whilst the imposition of a sanction 
is in principal a legal option with there being no factual obstacles present, 
as well as 5) the (temporary) withdrawal by the administrative agency of a 
decision taken by it to impose a sanction or the suspension of the enforce-
ment of such a decision.
The	research	defines	and	describes	thirteen	forms	of	tolerance.	Within	the	
context of discussing one of these forms in which ‘the supervisory task 
vested with the administrative agency is performed inadequately with the 
result	that	violations	are	not	observed’,	a	number	of	specific	issues	are	ad-
dressed that arise with respect to tolerance in the supervisory phase. Issues 
such as horizontal supervision and the priority policy adopted with respect 
to enforcement, as well as the obligation for administrative agencies to give 
adequate supervision are examined. It is concluded that the failure to ob-
serve a violation due to the fact that the focus of the supervisory authority 
was directed to other potential violations on grounds of a reasonable prior-
ity	policy	cannot	be	equated	with	the	practice	of	tolerance.	Furthermore,	it	
is suggested that alongside the (enforcement) decision provided for in art. 
1:3 Awb, the resolve not to take a decision but, for instance, to adopt a policy 
of persuasion, recommendations or warnings, can contribute to effective 
enforcement	and	need	not	necessarily	be	classed	as	tolerance.	However,	if	
these methods of intervention are not applied systematically and with due 
consideration and no sanctions are imposed when the desired effect of these 
interventions is not produced, they will yet lead to the practice of toler-
ance. 
Tolerance	is	largely	case	law.	For	this	reason	the	tolerance	case	law	of	the	
administrative courts is examined in detail (chapter 3). Particular focus is 
given to the ‘obligation in principle to enforce’ developed by the Adminis-
trative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (Afdeling bestuursrech-
tspraak van de Raad van State): administrative agencies should in principle 
take measures of enforcement against violations unless there are exceptional 





spect to all administrative sanctions. Whether or not there is an obligation 
in principle to enforce must be determined based on the content of each 
special act. The instances in which the practice of tolerance is acceptable on 
the	basis	of	case	law	are	divided	into	five	main	categories,	which	are	linked	
by the fact that enforcement should be deemed contrary to the principle of 
proportionality laid down in article 3:4, paragraph 2 of the General Admin-
istrative	Act	(Awb).	This	regards	the	following	five	categories:	1)	transition	
situations;  2) situations involving important interests that oppose enforce-
ment (the underlying interest or another interest worth protecting is best 
served through the practice of tolerance than enforcement, or enforcement 
will result in blatant inproportionality); 3) situations in which the enforce-
ment policy is judged as being  meaningless; 4) situations in which enforce-
ment is contrary to general principles of proper administration: the princi-
ples of protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty, the equality 
principle or the principle of fair play; 5) situations in which enforcement 
must be renounced for some other exceptional reason. 
The	importance	a	defined	enforcement	and	tolerance	policy	has	for	the	prac-
tice of tolerance is emphasised. Such an enforcement and tolerance policy 
promotes balanced and systematic procedures for making decisions on tol-
erance and thereby provides administrative agencies and citizens as well as 
judges and bodies responsible for administrative supervision with avenues 
of approach when making their decisions or when assessing the procedure 
for making decisions related to tolerance. Administrative agencies should 
therefore draw up a tolerance policy. This is often mistakenly not done. 




slim. To date, against the background of the obligation to enforce contained 
in	art.	10	EU	Treaty	(currently	art.	4	EU	Treaty),	the	Court	has	persistently	
ruled that in the direct application of community law the principle of legiti-
mate expectations under community law may not be contra legem. In these 
circumstances	the	practice	of	tolerance	is	impossible.	However,	when	EU	
law is applied indirectly the national principle of legitimate expectations 
provides limited opportunities to practice tolerance. (chapter 4).
When	discussing	the	ECHR	special	attention	is	given	to	art.	2	(right	to	life).	
The following government task can be derived from art. 2 and the case law 
with respect to this article: the government is obligated to take all measures 
summary
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that, partly in view of the powers granted to it, can be reasonably required of 
it to prevent a real and direct threat to life of which it is aware or should be 
aware	from	arising.	Here	it	does	not	matter	if	this	concerns	threats	caused	
by government services or third parties. In the light of this obligation the 
government must set up an adequate system of supervision and (preventive) 
enforcement; standard setting and the granting of permits on the basis of 
these standards should focus on the prevention of life threatening situa-
tions. 
Chapter 5 addresses a special category of cases in which tolerance is prac-
ticed: the cannabis coffee shops. Since the entering into force in 1999 of art. 
13b of the Netherlands Opium Act the mayor has the power, based directly 
on the Opium Act, to pursue enforcement activities with respect to cannabis 
coffee shops. As a result the authority to tolerate cannabis coffee shops is 
now also based on art. 13b. The principle underlying the tolerance policy 
with respect to cannabis coffee shops is the division between the market for 
hard drugs and the market for soft drugs (deemed desirable by the State, the 
mayor and the criminal authorities).
When weighing all the interests affected by the tolerance of cannabis coffee 
shops special meaning is given to the interests of public health protection 
and public order. In the positive decision to tolerate a cannabis coffee shop, 
contrary to ‘regular tolerance’, the temporary nature of the tolerance or the 
operation of the principle of proportionality only plays a role in exceptional 
cases;	in	fact	no	significance	at	all	is	given	to	the	possibility	of	legalization	
because legalization is excluded. Thus neither is there an obligation in prin-
ciple to pursue enforcement activities with respect to cannabis coffee shops, 
at	the	very	most	there	is	a	‘qualified	obligation	in	principle’.	Tolerance	case	
law such as that created under the obligation in principle formula has only 
a limited relevance to the practice of tolerance with respect to cannabis cof-
fee shops. 
In chapter 6 thirteen different types of decisions on the practice of toler-
ance are distinguished between and described. The formal requirements 
and requirements as regards content of two types of decisions on the prac-
tice of tolerance are examined more closely: the decision to award a toler-
ance permit and the decision to refuse such a permit. It is observed that the 
requirement formulated in the literature and the policy that a decision on 
tolerance should, with a view to the legal certainty and legal protection of 
third parties, be recorded in writing, is often ignored. 
summary
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This chapter also focuses on the legal safeguards provided by administra-
tive law in respect of the various types of tolerance decisions. In the last few 
years the Dutch Council of State has made some important rulings on the 
legal status of decisions on tolerance. What is most remarkable about this 
case law is that one and the same decision on tolerance can be both a decree 
and a factual act. Thus the awarding of a tolerance permit (stipulating term 
of	 tolerance	 and	 specifications)	 is	 a	 decree	when	 this	 concerns	 the	 legal	
protection of a third party. The refusal to award a tolerance permit or the 
withdrawal of a tolerance permit is, as far as the applicant or the tolerated 
party	is	concerned,	not	a	decree.	Furthermore,	the	awarding	of	a	tolerance	
permit with stricter requirements than was hoped for or for a shorter period 
of time than was hoped for is a decree for the third party but not a decree for 
the applicant. The withdrawal of a tolerance permit following an objection 
is, for reasons of legal protection, a decree.   
The Council of State’s approach is based on the consideration that when 
making such decisions the absence of legal consequences makes it hard to 
make a ‘normal’ decision. The distinction made by the Council of State is 
of huge importance to the legal protection of the tolerated party. According 
to the Council of State, in principle, in contrast to the third party, the ap-
plicant/tolerated party needs no legal protection with regard to a decision on 
tolerance (unfavourable for this party) because the relevant legal protection 
instruments are available to this party if the administrative agency imposes 
a recovery penalty after adopting the decision not to tolerate. This case law 
can create a very awkward situation for the tolerated party given that cer-
tainty with regard to the tolerated party’s legal status is only obtained at a 
late stage in the proceedings. Some situations have been examined in which 
this could lead to an unfair result.  
Chapter 7 addresses the tolerated party’s status if, after a period of toler-
ance, the administrative agency still decides to enforce. In some circum-
stances the administrative agency may be bound to pay compensation for 
loss resulting from administrative acts or if the practice of tolerance is end-
ed unlawfully, the agency may be bound to pay damages resulting from a 
wrongful act.
 
Article 3:4, paragraph 1 of the General Administrative Act (Awb) requires 
that the decision to actively end a situation in which tolerance is practiced 
must take account of all interests directly involved. Pursuant to this provi-
sion the disadvantages of the enforcement decree must not be disproportion-
ate with respect to the interests to be served by it. As a rule the conclusion 
will	be	 that	 there	are	no	obstacles	 to	enforcement.	However,	on	occasion	
summary
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in a situation in which tolerance is being practiced it may be necessary to 
take one or more of the following compensatory measures for the tolerated 
party: 1) active intervention by the administration to assist the offender on 
the ending of the tolerance, 2) the granting of a transitional period (e.g. the 
person-specific	tolerance	permit),	3)	the	payment	of	compensation	for	loss	
resulting from an administrative act. 
The legal ending of a situation in which tolerance is practiced will generally 
have	unfavourable	financial	consequences	for	the	tolerated	party.	As	a	rule	
these	are	 for	 the	account	of	 the	 tolerated	party.	Five	exceptional	 circum-
stances are however examined in which the enforcing authority must com-
pensate, either in part or in full, the tolerated party’s disadvantage in the 
form of compensation for loss resulting from an administrative act.  An im-
portant condition for the awarding of compensation for loss resulting from 
an administrative act in these cases is that the administrative agency played 
such a major role (sometimes an initiating role) in the practice of tolerance 
that	the	tolerated	party	justifiably	developed	high	expectations;	the	admin-
istrative agency has some form of ‘co-responsibility’ for the situation. The 
expectations are proved groundless because the administration changed its 
initial attitude with respect to the tolerated party. 
If the tolerated party is legally succeeded, e.g. if the tolerance relates to real 
estate, the legal successor (and the administrative agency) can be confront-
ed	with	some	exceptional	problems.	For	instance,	because	there	is	no	obli-
gation to publish notice of the awarding of tolerance permits and because 
tolerance is often practiced tacitly, it may be long before the (potential) legal 
successor knows whether or not the situation he enters is based on tolerance. 
It	is	not	unusual	for	the	person	concerned	to	be	notified	by	the	administra-
tive agency that the situation in which tolerance is practised ends on the 
succession. Possible solutions are put forward for the diverse cases. 
How,	 taking	 into	 consideration	 the	 principle	 of	 protection	 of	 legitimate	
expectations, the principle of proportionality and the prohibition on dé-
tournement de pouvoir does the decision on tolerance made by the adminis-
trative agency  relate to the authority of the Public Prosecutor to prosecute 
the (tolerated) offence? Chapter 8 demonstrates that to avoid confusion with 
regard to the possibility of prosecution in a case in which the administra-
tive agency is considering practicing tolerance, the administrative agencies 
and the Public Prosecutor must properly coordinate their mutual activities. 
Alongside this it is emphasised that tolerance does not formerly restrict the 
authority	of	the	courts,	but	it	can	exert	some	influence	especially	with	re-





this context it is observed that the use by the administrative agencies of 
the grounds for tolerance whereby the agency ‘seeks to protect an inter-
est requiring protection that is different from the interest that the provision 
which has been violated aims to protect’, is not necessarily in parallel with 
a	positive	reasoning	on	the	application	of	justifications	under	criminal	law	
with respect to the tolerated party.  In criminal law literature the excep-
tion	‘absence	of	material	illegality’	is	generally	considered	superfluous	due	
to	the	existence	of	other	exceptions.	However,	it	is	very	doubtful	whether	
these other exceptions can help with respect to all the acceptable grounds 
for tolerance referred to in the case law of the administrative courts and 
the policy papers. Some situations are described which can probably not be 
summarized under the heading ‘other exceptions’. In these cases the excep-
tion ‘absence of material illegality’ could provide a solution. 
Chapter 8 closes with a few paragraphs on the position of the government 
(the	 legal	person,	appointed	under	public	 law)	and	 its	officials	as	accom-
plices or even co-perpetrators in a case in which a violation of a statutory 
provision is tolerated by that legal person and/or its personnel (the complic-
ity, the co-perpetration in this case regards the tolerance of the violation). 
Given the nature of the (decision making procedure regarding) enforcement 
of the statutory provisions and thus (the decision making procedure) re-
garding the tolerance of violations of these provisions and in view of the 
legislative system, this power is so inextricably bound to government that 
it can only be exercised by or for the competent administrative agency and 
under its full administrative responsibility (in all of its subtleties). This is an 
exclusive prerogative of public powers. Case law shows us that this means 
legal persons at a lower level, appointed under public law (as well as their 
personnel), are granted immunity if their practice of tolerance makes them 
guilty of (participation in) a criminal offence. When a government shies 
away from its enforcement duties, this is not a fair outcome. 
The amendment to art. 42 Sr (‘reasonably necessary offences committed by 
an	official	or	legal	person	appointed	under	public	law	in	the	performance	of	
a public duty assigned to them by a statutory provision shall not be punish-
able’)	suggested	by	Heerds,	Van	de	Kamp	and	Anker	in	the	draft	proposal	is	
particularly	significant	for	legal	persons	and	their	officials	appointed	under	
public law who practice tolerance. Tolerance can be seen as the perform-
ance of a public power granted by a statutory provision; after all, according 




has committed a crime on grounds of public law. 
The way in which the consequences of the practice of tolerance for third 
parties	are	dealt	with	is	considered	in	chapter	9.	The	first	question	is	wheth-
er in the case of lawful tolerance these parties are entitled to claim compen-
sation as a result of an administrative act.  In the context of awarding such 
compensation to a third party disadvantaged by the practice of tolerance 
the Council of State apparently applies a strict causal link. In line with its 
most far reaching reasoning the third party damage is not due to the toler-
ance permit but to the tolerated actions of the tolerated party. As I see it this 
line	of	reasoning	cannot	be	used	as	a	basis	in	all	cases.	Here	it	is	useful	to	
distinguish between two categories of public interests to be protected by the 
government on grounds of its public duty, i.e. individual interests and col-
lective interests (community interests). Individual interests are the interests 
of private parties: a natural person or a legal person not appointed under 
public law. If these interests are protected by the government on grounds 
of its public duty, they also take on the character of a public interest: there 
is ‘an individual public interest’. Collective interests are public interests not 
having an individual (private) nature that are protected by the government: 
there is ‘a collective public interest’. 
The causal link between the tolerance decree and the disadvantage of a third 
party can only be deemed strong enough if this disadvantage is (predomi-
nantly) induced to safeguard collective public interests.  
A legal person appointed under public law can be held liable in tort in con-
nection with tolerance if the administrative agency (belonging to the legal 
person) has been negligent in monitoring (supervising) compliance with the 
regulation or has not taken enforcement measures to prevent or to end the 
violation of the regulation as a result of which a third party has incurred 
damage. Not all negligent acts performed by the administrative agency in 
the context of supervision and enforcement result in liability. The negli-
gence must be contrary to that which in accordance with custom is aspired 
to in social intercourse. In other words: there must be evidence of a violation 
of a legal duty to supervise or enforce (‘the standard of due care’). 
With a view to the content of the standard of due care the obligation in prin-
ciple to enforce as developed in administrative case law is dwelt upon. The 
obligation in principle may have restricted the policy freedom of adminis-
trative	agencies	with	respect	to	enforcement	but	it	has	not	undone	it.	Every	
decision	on	whether	or	not	to	resort	to	sanctions	in	a	specific	case	must	be	
preceded by a weighing-up of the interests that are directly involved. Partic-
summary
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ular weight is attached to enforcement, but the room left over for tolerance 
is anything but negligible. In the context of liability law this notion is of par-
ticular importance: indeed, with a view to determining the liability standard 
the question of whether or not the administration is at liberty to weigh-up 
interests when performing its enforcement duty through the imposition of 
sanctions is pivotal. The supervision of enforcement (control) is approached 
in a different way. There is no obligation in principle to supervise binding 
the competent administrative agency in principle to monitor all possible 
violations; there is ‘merely’ an obligation to exercise adequate supervision. 
On grounds of its policy freedom the administrative agency is allowed to 
prioritize the supervision. The failure to detect a violation due to prioritisa-
tion is not the same as tolerance and thus does not result in an unlawful act. 
For	specific	potential	violations,	where	there	is	an	indication	or	warning	that	
a violation is being made or will be made, there is an obligation in principle 
to supervise. Ignoring this information is a form of tolerance and may be 
unlawful.
The obligation in principle to enforce is in my opinion  a standard of case 
law	which,	in	view	of	its	specific	administrative	legal	history,	background	
and character, is not suitable (nor intended) to be applied automatically  as a 
standard of due care in tort law. 
There is no regular applicable standard of liability (standard of due care) 
with respect to inadequate supervision and poor enforcement. The standard 
varies from one statutory regulation to another and from case to case. There 
is an increased duty of care in cases involving health and safety risks. In 
such cases high requirements are imposed on supervision, the (temporary) 
omittance of enforcement measures is only possible to a limited extent. In 
other cases a moderate standard of due care can apply. This standard boils 
down to whether the administrative agency acted in accordance with stand-
ards of reasonableness. It would seem that, although cautiously, the courts 
are tending to veer towards the same approach. 
In	a	specific	case	the	defining	of	the	administrative	agency’s	care	duty	in	the	
field	of	supervision	and	enforcement	depends	on	the	enforcement	activities	
that the administrative agency could be expected to perform at any moment 
in time in its capacity as a proper and diligent supervisor and enforcer. 
Hereby	taking	into	account:	on the one hand: 1) its statutory supervisory 
and enforcement duties and the objective of these duties; 2) the interests 
that the legal system seeks to protect; 3) the policy freedom granted to the 







and cautious, 2) the likelihood that accidents occur, 3) the seriousness of the 
consequences, 4) the degree of inconvenience resulting from the measures). 
As far as the timeliness and nature of the measures to be taken by the admin-
istrative agency are concerned the administrative agency should, depending 
on the circumstances, be granted some room for manoeuvre to achieve a 
legal status without imposing a sanction. 
The	condicio	sine	qua	non	requirement	(causality)	can	pose	significant	prob-
lems for the party affected, given that the administrative agency has free-
dom of policy regarding its choice of the recovery sanctions to be imposed 
and	the	content	thereof.	In	the	specific	situation	it	is	the	court	that	shall	de-
termine the instrument (and method) the administrative agency should rea-
sonably have applied and more particularly whether, if this had been done, 
the	damage	would	not	have	been	incurred.	Here	factors	play	a	part	such	as:	
1) the feasibility of the factual application of administrative force; 2) the 
proportionality of the administrative force with respect to the offender; 3) 
the disadvantages for third parties of the continuation of the illegal status; 
4) the risks the government would have been exposed to in connection with 
the exercise of administrative force in the event of the administrative force 
decree	being	nullified.	
Chapter 10, the concluding chapter, addresses the question of whether it is 
recommendable to introduce legislation to regulate (aspects of) the practice 
of tolerance by administrative agencies. The answer to this question led to, 
among others, the following conclusions: 
I.	 From	the	perspective	of	adequate	enforcement,	with	regard	to	the	sub-
stance	of	 the	supervision	of	compliance	with	specific	statutory	provi-
sions, particularly those affecting the health and safety of people and 
animals, the legislator should lay down rules at least with respect to:  1) 
the lower threshold of the frequency of the supervision; 2) the objects 
that are the focus of the supervision; 3) the way in which the supervision 
is exercised.
II. In view of the great importance enforcement policy has for the regulation 
of the policy freedom of the administration with respect to supervision, 
imposition of sanctions and sanctions enforcement it is recommendable 
that a universal obligation be included in the General Administrative 
Act for administrative agencies to adopt an enforcement policy. 




a decision on tolerance in writing. 
V.	 The	General	Administrative	Act	should	stipulate	that	a	decision	on	tol-
erance is a decree. Chapter 10 contains the components of the arrange-
ments	recommended	in	points	IV	and	V.
VI.	For	the	benefit	of	the	tolerated	party,	its	successor,	the	interested	third	par-
ty and the administrative agency tolerance decrees on real estate should 
be registered in a public register that is accessible through internet. 
